Is karma flawed?

[Nostradamus]

So here is the situation. In your life you have done more bad things than good and you decide to try and make the good outweigh the bad by means of karma. However in doing this doesn't this make the 'good' deed selfish and therefore a bad deed?

Just as wouldn't doing a good deed with the knowledge that this is good karma make it selfish and therefore bad karma.

Or is my understanding of karma flawed?

(I realise that all these views rely on a definition of good and bad but I am focusing on the karma side)

[Anoiktos]

I don't think there are specific rules about this kind of thing, but I would assume that karma must work by action, not intention, as even philanthropy tends to be an obscure form of self-promotion.

[Oblongato]

In fact, if you missed the discussion in a previous thread, there are those (such as myself) who will argue that all acts, even those such as sacrificing one's own life, are selfish.

And if you help others to get something you want, I'd call it a win/win situation.

Universe: "You'll pay for helping all of those people!"

Cockroach: "Heck."

On the other hand, if you were to cause problems for others with your well meaning but incompetent bungling, I'm sure people would be grateful if you gave up the good deeds. Would that then be good karma?

[UMSLdragon]

My take on Karma was that it was the intention that mattered, along with the act.

On the take of selfishness: it would depend on how you would intend it. Hence my previous sentence. It would depend on if you considered the act of being better to become better thoughout "life," a 'good' selfish, or a 'bad' selfish. Wouldn't selfishness be able to be 'good' and bad' at the same time? (:o) I mean, isn't there such a thing as constructive selfishness and destructive selfishness... (still not helping...)

Hmmm, defining 'selfish' as terms of yourself, everything you can possibly do would be selfish. In that definition, by being "unselfish," you could potentionally be selfish... ah... I think my brain just blew up... ow!

dam, I just de-flawed karma! Bad, UMSL. BAD!

EDIT: lol, Oblongato. You just posted before me :P

[Icarus]

simply because all actions CAN be selfish, doesn't mean that is the intention.

Hinduism is the religion that has the most clarity in it's purpose, and that is to regulate the common peoples. Karma really isn't meant to be "good" or "bad", but what is socially acceptable by the current religious leaders. It, in essence, is the hindu translation of cause and effect.

So ultimately, hinduism requires you to be selfish (if you observe the vedas) in order to be "good", and reincarnate as a higher form.

So what you described is usually how karma is supposed to work.

EDIT: this comes from my understanding of older hinduism. Although I doubt the religion has changed much (judging from the regions history), I may be inaccurate in some parts.

[Prozerran]

What Oblongato either fails to still realize or just simply refuses to accept is that selfishness is not a virtue in and of itself. While you seem to keep wanting to define it as such, selfishness is not recognized in terms of karma, so it's not relevant to the discussion.

As to the matter at hand, I see the concept of karma as reciprocal. When one lives so long performing bad acts, karma will reflect in this individual's life (which may serve as a reason for why someone chooses to instead perform good acts) as this person's interaction with his environment will ultimately change and thus improve his or her quality of life. So, in a manner of speaking, the weight of the good to the bad is really a question of how long said individual has behaved badly, and thus, is not a quantifiable measure of the karma system.

Or in other words, karma is forgiving. Just because you've been bad doesn't mean that if you do good you will still be reciprocating bad karma because of the bad acts you have performed. There is really no flaw here.

[Oblongato]

What Oblongato either fails to still realize or just simply refuses to accept is that selfishness is not a virtue in and of itself. While you seem to keep wanting to define it as such, selfishness is not recognized in terms of karma, so it's not relevant to the discussion.

Show me where I have ever written what you are stating as my position or consider your argument dismissed.

As for karma, I think if it is your genuine intent to help others (and not just some excuse you make to yourself to justify your actions) then it doesn't matter whether you get something out of it too. With my point on selfishness, I mean to say that you always get something out of everything you do, even if it is just a good feeling. (Feeling good about yourself is a more powerful motivation than most people realize.) The difference in a karma sense is apparent when you compare the good feeling you get from helping others with what you get when you beat and rob someone to get money for drugs. The latter, to be sure, is bad karma. Both actions, however, are selfish in the sense that I mean it.

[Prozerran]

Show me where I have ever written what you are stating as my position or consider your argument dismissed.

Ok. How about this?

As for karma, I think if it is your genuine intent to help others (and not just some excuse you make to yourself to justify your actions) then it doesn't matter whether you get something out of it too. With my point on selfishness, I mean to say that you always get something out of everything you do, even if it is just a good feeling. (Feeling good about yourself is a more powerful motivation than most people realize.) The difference in a karma sense is apparent when you compare the good feeling you get from helping others with what you get when you beat and rob someone to get money for drugs. The latter, to be sure, is bad karma. Both actions, however, are selfish in the sense that I mean it.

If you think you're not trying to equivocate your argument of selfishness with the concept of Karma, try again. The fundamental problem with your position is that it assumes too much about the intent of the actor. Just because someone CAN BE selfish doesn't necessarily mean that they ARE selfish. Or in other words, just because an action leaves a question of selfish intent doesn't mean we can just ASSUME there was something selfish in the act or in the person's nature for performing the act.

[Oblongato]

I think it is clear from my statements that I do not believe selfishness is a virtue. (If you still think so, read it again.)

It should also be clear from my initial statement that from my perspective all conscious actions are selfish. Obviously, I am basing my statements on my own perspective, not yours.

My comments were also intended to show that selfishness, since it is universal in conscious actions (from my perspective), has no relevance in the question of karma.

To reiterate: I am saying that selfish intent is present in one form or another (see the examples in my previous post) in every conscious action, period. I am aware that you don't agree, but you'll have to argue against it if you want the discussion to progress, not just misstate and ignore my position.

[Prozerran]

To reiterate: I am saying that selfish intent is present in one form or another (see the examples in my previous post) in every conscious action, period. I am aware that you don't agree, but you'll have to argue against it if you want the discussion to progress, not just misstate and ignore my position.

I've misstated nothing (if we're actually referencing the previous discussion we had on this topic). The simple problem with your argument is that it assumes too much. The end. Finito. All I should need to say to pretty much explain why you are wrong.

Selfishness is a state of mind (i.e. intent), not a universal truth. Placating it as such is a misrepresentation of its meaning, not an explanation your own position on the topic. Stop repeating yourself. Read. Comprehend. Repeat.

[Oblongato]

I've misstated nothing (if we're actually referencing the previous discussion we had on this topic). The simple problem with your argument is that it assumes too much. The end. Finito. All I should need to say to pretty much explain why you are wrong.

Selfishness is a state of mind (i.e. intent), not a universal truth. Placating it as such is a misrepresentation of its meaning, not an explanation your own position on the topic. Stop repeating yourself. Read. Comprehend. Repeat.

Empty assertions do not an argument make. This post doesn't even merit a reply, but I will repeat myself for your benefit:

I did not state, and do not believe, that selfishness is a virtue. Your statement to the contrary is simply incorrect, careless and inconsiderate.

And if you think you can end the argument with one vague sentence and a "The end. Finito," you only convince me your post is not worthy of my attention. Only morons are impressed by such empty bluster.

Be reasonable and polite and I'd be happy to discuss the topic with you.

[Icarus]

You forgot that he pointed out the assumptions you make.

Selfishness inherently isn't a virtue, I don't think anyone is objecting that.

But selfishness is defined as the concern solely for yourself. If people were truly concerned only with themselves, they wouldn't bother helping other people on the way. You're assuming motives for what people do, and assuming that all effects of their actions are intended and valued, i.e. benefit for the self, which you simply cannot tell, for they themselves are individuals, and whose minds cannot be read.

Also, there are some clear examples of altruistic acts, say, dying in military service, or any death used to benefit others. Death disallows you to reap any benefit for selfish intentions.

[Oblongato]

You forgot that he pointed out the assumptions you make.

I didn't forget, and he didn't say what the assumptions were.

Selfishness inherently isn't a virtue, I don't think anyone is objecting that.

He clearly stated that I didn't realize or refused to accept that selfishness was [edit: not!] a virtue. He was wrong.

But selfishness is defined as the concern solely for yourself. If people were truly concerned only with themselves, they wouldn't bother helping other people on the way. You're assuming motives for what people do, and assuming that all effects of their actions are intended and valued, i.e. benefit for the self, which you simply cannot tell, for they themselves are individuals, and whose minds cannot be read.

Also, there are some clear examples of altruistic acts, say, dying in military service, or any death used to benefit others. Death disallows you to reap any benefit for selfish intentions.

I've pretty much laid out the definition of selfish that I am using here with my examples. My definition of selfish includes actions chosen for their emotional effect on the self. This means that if something is important enough to the self, the self can even sacrifice itself to get, maintain or avoid emotions. You are assuming a different definition of selfish. (There are several.) Death as the chosen result of an action of the self does not preclude selfishness. Example: Suicide to avoid the pain of illness or injury. Another example: Giving one's life to save loved ones because you realize you could not "live with yourself" if you did not.

Regardless of the action, there is always a benefit to the self. Therefore, all chosen actions are selfish. If you don't agree, give me examples of actions where there is absolutely no benefit to the self, also not from a psychological standpoint.

[Prozerran]

He clearly stated that I didn't realize or refused to accept that selfishness was a virtue. He was wrong.

Heh, you clearly seem to confuse yourself and others by defining terms for yourself based on how you need them to pertain to your position. Forgive me if I don't buy it.


I've pretty much laid out the definition of selfish that I am using here with my examples. My definition of selfish includes actions chosen for their emotional effect on the self.

Case in point. "My definition of selfish includes..." is just another example of Language Games of the Postmodern Condition. You can define selfish until your face turns blue, but it neither adds to the discussion nor detracts from my position that your position is baseless in fact and terminology.

This means that if something is important enough to the self, the self can even sacrifice itself to get, maintain or avoid emotions. You are assuming a different definition of selfish. (There are several.)

Bullshit. In your universe, there may be, but unfortunately for you, in the real world we define terminology based on an agreement of the terminology. If you think you can make an argument simply by adding something that otherwise is not agreed upon, then maybe that is the flaw in your reasoning you should consider before you respond to this post.

Death as the chosen result of an action of the self does not preclude selfishness. Example: Suicide to avoid the pain of illness or injury. Another example: Giving one's life to save loved ones because you realize you could not "live with yourself" if you did not.

Regardless of the action, there is always a benefit to the self. Therefore, all chosen actions are selfish. If you don't agree, give me examples of actions where there is absolutely no benefit to the self, also not from a psychological standpoint.

Right, because you want to change the terminology. Please, show us an agreed-upon definition that qualifies your position. More than likely, there is no definition, but if there may be a clause that could be subjectively approached that supports your position, it would definitely help you at this point.

I like debating with you Ob, seriously, I do, but let's keep it real. I'm calling you out. You don't have to get upset. Just show us where you're getting "your" definition, and we'll have something to discuss here.

[Oblongato]

I like debating you, too. ;)

In a philosophical discussion, you are trying to talk about things that are not necessarily accepted viewpoints. Since you are trying to break new ground to some extent, you have to explain exactly what you mean. Nevertheless, it is tiring to put in the explanation every time, and so you may take a word that is not necessarily commonly used in the way you are using it and give it your meaning for the purpose of discussion.

The key, I believe, is explaining exactly how you are using a word. I try to do that, but maybe I should call greater attention to it. Otherwise the temptation exists to continue to read the word as it is commonly used, which I believe to be the case here. That results in semantic dissonance.

If you define your terms adequately, it doesn't really matter what word you use; it's the concept that's important.

So, what do you think of my concept? I'll be happy to try to flesh it out if you want more detail.

[IrishDutchman]

Regardless of the action, there is always a benefit to the self. Therefore, all chosen actions are selfish. If you don't agree, give me examples of actions where there is absolutely no benefit to the self, also not from a psychological standpoint.

I think you're missing 124167's point here. A benefit to oneself is not necessarily a selfish thing. What if I trip, and protect my head from the fall with my hands. I would benefit from it, but would it be selfish?
Deeds are only selfish when they benefit yourself, and hinder or damage others. It is an act that puts your needs before those of others.
So, sacrificing your own life to save anothers is not a selfish deed, even if your only motivation is to gather some 'good karma'. Yes, you will have done it to benefit yourself, but you've greatly helped others in the process, making it in no way selfish.

[Oblongato]

I think you're missing 124167's point here. A benefit to oneself is not necessarily a selfish thing. What if I trip, and protect my head from the fall with my hands. I would benefit from it, but would it be selfish?
Deeds are only selfish when they benefit yourself, and hinder or damage others. It is an act that puts your needs before those of others.
So, sacrificing your own life to save anothers is not a selfish deed, even if your only motivation is to gather some 'good karma'. Yes, you will have done it to benefit yourself, but you've greatly helped others in the process, making it in no way selfish.

OK, I think I will save everyone a lot of trouble here if I abandon the word selfish. I wish I could see some indication that you had read my most recent post above, but I think it will be simpler if I substitute "word-that-means-that-the-intention-of-all-conscious-actions-is-to-serve-the self-and-not-others". Simply substitute this expression everywhere I have used the world "selfish".

With this principle at work, however, you should not assume that there is no motivation to help others. The self needs others, and forming good relationships with others, even loving others, serves the self. This is why we do it. You might say it best serves the interests of the self in most cases if the self is concerned with helping others, cooperating with others and making others happy.

I do not believe that selfless actions exist. In fact, the idea of a selfless action is almost absurd. By my definition, an action chosen by the self can not be selfless. Every action chosen by the self is aimed at creating a situation that the self wants. We do not intentionally make others happy unless we believe that making them happy will make us happy too. This is how "word-that-means-that-the-intention-of-all-conscious-actions-is-to-serve-the self-and-not-others" works. My self wants to be liked, wants the love and support of others. How to get it? The most logical method is to treat them as I would like to be treated. Of course, there are also those selves who gain things by treating others badly. This is the traditional definition of the word selfish, which I believe to contain philosophical inaccuracies.

Consider what is at the base of our motivations. Beneath the level of logic, beneath the level of reason, is emotion. Why do we want one thing over another? Ultimately, we want it because of how it makes us feel, because of the emotions behind it. And if our emotions are the basis of our motivation, then our conscious thought and actions serve our emotions. This is where it becomes clear how the self can sacrifice itself in a situation. There are some emotional states that are more powerful than the will to survive. Among them are the desire to protect loved ones. Also included would be all motivations for suicide. Suicide serves the self because it protects the self from the unbearable. Survival is not always the most powerful motivation of the self.

[Kankuro4800]

If you decide to do good things to balance out the bad, its selfish so it doesnt count, the good (the deed) and bad (selfishness) cancel each other out and it counts as '0 karma points'
To get '+ Karma Points', you must just do good things unconciously and without malcontent.

[Prozerran]

I do not believe that selfless actions exist. In fact, the idea of a selfless action is almost absurd. By my definition, an action chosen by the self can not be selfless. Every action chosen by the self is aimed at creating a situation that the self wants. We do not intentionally make others happy unless we believe that making them happy will make us happy too. This is how "word-that-means-that-the-intention-of-all-conscious-actions-is-to-serve-the self-and-not-others" works. My self wants to be liked, wants the love and support of others. How to get it? The most logical method is to treat them as I would like to be treated. Of course, there are also those selves who gain things by treating others badly. This is the traditional definition of the word selfish, which I believe to contain philosophical inaccuracies.

Consider what is at the base of our motivations. Beneath the level of logic, beneath the level of reason, is emotion. Why do we want one thing over another? Ultimately, we want it because of how it makes us feel, because of the emotions behind it. And if our emotions are the basis of our motivation, then our conscious thought and actions serve our emotions. This is where it becomes clear how the self can sacrifice itself in a situation. There are some emotional states that are more powerful than the will to survive. Among them are the desire to protect loved ones. Also included would be all motivations for suicide. Suicide serves the self because it protects the self from the unbearable. Survival is not always the most powerful motivation of the self.

I see your point, and I think that really your philosophical argument (while I don't agree with it) has something behind it. My problem is with your claim that the basis of our motivation is universally emotion. Across the board, I'd have to disagree. Sure, there are those who perform acts based on emotion. There are others who act based on necessity, regardless of their emotional state. These people hold a belief not related to emotion at all, but a sense of duty to perform a given action, a sense of purpose, a sense of function. So, while there is an emotional basis in many cases, there is also a functional basis in JUST as many cases.

Now, whether you believe there is an emotional basis behind the latter is up to you. Keep in mind though, there is a difference between an emotional stimulus and an emotional reinforcement in all acts. For instance, if you were emotionally driven to act, your act centers around the self. However, if you were driven to act based on some sense of purpose, the act centers around the purpose which may later be reinforced by some emotion you sense in completing the act. This doesn't necessarily mean you have this expectation of having this emotion when acting on some functional stimulus.

So, yeah, there is just a bit more to it. It's very difficult to apply human behavior to one universal principle. When you add emotion to the equation, it only gets more complicated and less likely to become a universal principle of human behavior.

[Oblongato]

Why do we think one thing is better than another; why do we want one thing instead of another thing? What underlies our choices? To what end to we employ our logic? We want to satisfy our drives, yes, and beyond that? I suggest it is our values. But why do we value something? What does it mean when we value something? I propose that in every case where we value something, the basis is the emotion that we associate with the thing valued. In other words, it is not possible to value something without emotion.

Or can you give me an example of something valued that is not connected in any way to an emotion?

Similarly, can you give me an example of a choice that is in no way connected with the values of the individual making the decision?

What I'm really getting at is a model of the self:

- at the lowest level, the drives (survival, sex, etc.)
- at the next level emotion
- at the highest level conscious thought

In this model, each higher level is based on the level (s) below it.

Therefore, a conscious decision is based first on a drive, but also on emotion. The conscious part consists basically of the use of logic to attain what the lower levels (drive and emotions [values]) want.

You mention a sense duty. What is a sense of duty, where does it come from? Why do some individuals have a sense of duty and others not?

You mention a sense of purpose, and suggest that the purpose is then the center of the action. But where does this sense of purpose come from? What underlies it? How is it possible to have a sense of purpose that does not rest on a foundation of values (which are an expression of emotion)?

[IrishDutchman]

If you decide to do good things to balance out the bad, its selfish so it doesnt count, the good (the deed) and bad (selfishness) cancel each other out and it counts as '0 karma points'
To get '+ Karma Points', you must just do good things unconciously and without malcontent.

Deeds are only selfish when they benefit yourself, and hinder or damage others. It is an act that puts your needs before those of others.
So, sacrificing your own life to save anothers is not a selfish deed, even if your only motivation is to gather some 'good karma'. Yes, you will have done it to benefit yourself, but you've greatly helped others in the process, making it in no way selfish.

Say if someone has led a terrible, criminal and evil life. Around his 40's he realises what an awful person he's been, and decides to turn it all upside down. He gives all his money to a homeless person and starts helping little kids in africa.
He does this because he has a bad conciousness, he feels the need to make up for the bad things he's done in his life. It's not 'bad karma' to do anything like that.
The world benefits from his acts, and in the process so does he. I don't see why anyone would deem him 'bad' because of it. IMO, a good act will remain good, regardless of the motivation.
Likewise, a bad act will not be bad, if the motivation is good . If I accidentaly blow up someones car while I'm trying to fix the engine, it's not bad karma.

[Prozerran]

Therefore, a conscious decision is based first on a drive, but also on emotion. The conscious part consists basically of the use of logic to attain what the lower levels (drive and emotions [values]) want.

You mention a sense duty. What is a sense of duty, where does it come from? Why do some individuals have a sense of duty and others not?

You mention a sense of purpose, and suggest that the purpose is then the center of the action. But where does this sense of purpose come from? What underlies it? How is it possible to have a sense of purpose that does not rest on a foundation of values (which are an expression of emotion)?


Where does this sense of duty come from, you ask? To understand the model I'm working with, you need to understand the principles of stimulus to act.

Stimuli are generated from one of two sources: internal or external. An internal stimulus is one of emotional or physical phenomena. An external stimulus is one that occurs in our environment, something that regardless of our emotional state, will call upon us to act.

If we reduce this all down to one stimulus, then we will only act when we are emotionally charged to act, and like I've already stated, this may be the case for many. For others, however, it may be the case that no emotion is involved in the choices one makes. For instance, if someone who is not emotionally connected to the work they do may never be happy doing what they are doing, but they'll continue to do it because of some external reason. A truck driver may have no emotional desire to drive across the country week after week for little money, but because he knows of nothing else that he would prefer to do with his life, he does it out of the simple decision that he has bills to pay and he can tolerate the work.

A farmer may not love to farm. But he owns the land, he has the animals, and he can tolerate the work. There are numerous examples I can think of where one may choose to do something based on the circumstance, devoid of any emotional stimulus to do so. It sometimes amazes me that people can neutralize their misery by simply deciding that they can tolerate the work they do. They decide they might as well do what they know how to do instead of trying to find something they'd be happier doing.

Ever worked a "Joe-job"? Ever felt emotionally attached to that work? You might suppose that there is some emotional basis for doing the work, but the simple truth is that you have no money, and because you need work experience (you have an external stimulus) you go get a job. It doesn't matter. I've known cooks in restaurants who aren't at all emotionally attached to the work they do. They could care less, especially since most of them work in restaurants so they can do drugs (restaurants generally don't drug test). While you might want to argue that there is an emotional stimulus here (some desire to do drugs, hence why one might decide to be a cook in a restaurant), you have to consider what the stimulus really is here. The truth is that while there may be some internal stimulus to do drugs, the stimulus to work in a restaurant under these circumstances is purely external.

The problem I have with your model is that it tries to overgeneralize human behavior. I think emotion has a place in human behavior, but I don't think that emotion produces a stimulus in all cases. In the cases I've just mentioned, the emotion is a result of the circumstance created by the behavior stimulated by external phenomena. With your model, the emotion would, in these cases, lead the trucker, the kid with the "Joe-job", and the cook to seek different work. But, as is often the case, the trucker stays a trucker. The Joe-job kid sometimes keeps his Joe-job for the rest of his life. The cook stays a cook until he dies. You can't pin EVERYTHING down to emotion when it doesn't accurately present itself in all cases.

[UMSLdragon]

As reading through all these posts, a question has come to my mind. Who decides what is good karma or bad karma that would determine the individuals next life?

You people are debating about whether selfishness is relevant and how it fits in to the Karma 'theory.' But I ask, who determines whether the individual is selfish that would result in bad karma. What is the determining factor? Or who even?

[Oblongato]

@Prozerran:

Just as a reminder, I'm not stating my position is correct, it's just the current state of my own thinking on the topic. Nevertheless, I do see it as the best-supported of the theories of self from my own perspective, which includes my own (to some extent subjective) experience.

Anyway, it may help you to understand what I am getting at if you consider that there are not only emotional incentives; but also emotional disincentives, emotional states we do not want to face; in addition to emotional states we simply want to preserve.

Btw, yes, I've had a Joe-job (or McJob?), and no, I didn't find it all that fulfilling. Nevertheless, thinking back on those days I can remember what the emotions were behind the decision to take such a job and to keep it as long as I did. It was not the incentive so much as maintaining acceptable emotions or avoiding negative ones.

And all of this is only an over-generalization if you assume that the self is able to function without a constantly active emotional element.

@UMSLdragon

I would argue that the individual determines the nature of karma. People who hurt others believing that they are helping are still doing the best they can based on their understanding and experience of the world. Assuming the system is fair, it cannot penalize people for things over which they have no control. That would be the intent-based version.

The alternative, of course, would be to determine the ultimate value of the result of the individual's actions. But this is impossible because different perspectives exist in different individuals and the value of the result can change from moment to moment, being in one moment good and in the next bad, or both, depending on the perspective (s).

[IrishDutchman]

You people are debating about whether selfishness is relevant and how it fits in to the Karma 'theory.' But I ask, who determines whether the individual is selfish that would result in bad karma. What is the determining factor? Or who even?

Well, this 'karma system' is a guideline to how you should live your life. We shouldn't see this as a scoring method for what's going to happen to you after you die. Try to imagine it more as a metaphor, a more tangible way of determining 'good' and 'evil' acts in your life.

[Prozerran]

@Prozerran:

Just as a reminder, I'm not stating my position is correct, it's just the current state of my own thinking on the topic. Nevertheless, I do see it as the best-supported of the theories of self from my own perspective, which includes my own (to some extent subjective) experience.

Anyway, it may help you to understand what I am getting at if you consider that there are not only emotional incentives; but also emotional disincentives, emotional states we do not want to face; in addition to emotional states we simply want to preserve.

Btw, yes, I've had a Joe-job (or McJob?), and no, I didn't find it all that fulfilling. Nevertheless, thinking back on those days I can remember what the emotions were behind the decision to take such a job and to keep it as long as I did. It was not the incentive so much as maintaining acceptable emotions or avoiding negative ones.

And all of this is only an over-generalization if you assume that the self is able to function without a constantly active emotional element.

Emotional disincentives, eh? Hmm... again I think we're just adding more terminology. Emotional detachment would be MY view, which is a more well-developed area of study in psychology. The emotional element may contribute in certain ways when the choice is initially made to make a longterm commitment to something you would otherwise care not to do. But think about the fact that over time, this individual will continually make this decision, over and over, every day for the rest of his or her life. The emotional detachment from this repetitious cycle of denial is a strong indicator to me that emotions don't DRIVE us to make choices. Instead, emotions are the result of the choices we make.

[Protosschick99]

What goes around, comes around.

End of story.

[Oblongato]

Emotional disincentives, eh? Hmm... again I think we're just adding more terminology. Emotional detachment would be MY view, which is a more well-developed area of study in psychology. The emotional element may contribute in certain ways when the choice is initially made to make a longterm commitment to something you would otherwise care not to do. But think about the fact that over time, this individual will continually make this decision, over and over, every day for the rest of his or her life. The emotional detachment from this repetitious cycle of denial is a strong indicator to me that emotions don't DRIVE us to make choices. Instead, emotions are the result of the choices we make.

I agree that there is such a thing as emotional detachment, a gradual process by which the original emotional stimulus becomes fainter and fainter, basically just as you describe it. (We touched on this in the other thread.) The difference is that I would say complete emotional detachment means that the action is no longer a conscious choice but instead a mechanical repetition. I am restricting my argument to conscious actions.

Also, I am certainly not saying that emotions do not result from choices. Of course they do. But I still argue that emotions are at the basis of all conscious choices.

[Prozerran]

I agree that there is such a thing as emotional detachment, a gradual process by which the original emotional stimulus becomes fainter and fainter, basically just as you describe it. (We touched on this in the other thread.) The difference is that I would say complete emotional detachment means that the action is no longer a conscious choice but instead a mechanical repetition. I am restricting my argument to conscious actions.

Also, I am certainly not saying that emotions do not result from choices. Of course they do. But I still argue that emotions are at the basis of all conscious choices.

Yeah, as we keep picking away at the argument you're making here, it becomes more and more clear that the basis is becoming more and more skewed. Like I originally said, unless there is a clear, blanket example across the board that emotion is behind ALL conscious choice, I'm going to have to remain convinced that internal and external stimuli are the best explanation available.

And let me reiterate that adding more and more terminology is not helping. Mechanical repetition (i.e. daily schedule or routine) still creates an emotional response. The detachment I refer to is a failure to act on the emotion, therefore providing direct contradictory information for your theory. Now, interpretation being what it is, you can argue until your face turns blue that there may be some emotional disincentive involved with not acting upon an emotion, but regardless of the interpretation, the fact remains clear that if your model says emotion charges one to act, one will always act based on the emotion or the disincentive of the emotion. The unwillingness to face an emotion should not, in your model, create a failure to act.

The separation created by emotional detachment, on the other hand, lends itself to the model of internal and external stimuli quite readily, and it tends to account for itself without the need for extraneous terminology that is self-defined. I agree that emotion can stimulate an individual to act, but it just doesn't happen in ALL CASES. Be that as it may, your model does lend itself nicely to the notion of internal stimulus, so it's not that it doesn't have any relevance. I think it's only misplaced in the larger picture of the human condition. I guess it's all food for thought, but at least it helps narrow down your area of influence on the model you present here. Think about how broadly you really are applying this, because at the very least, it's too general for the amount of examples out there that you have to explain.

And you know, if we apply it to our previous discussion on altruism as a selfish act, again we can see how your model and mine differ. For example, someone performing an altruistic act based on the internal, emotional desire to put oneself in harm's way for the prevention of harm to another, is somewhat based on the self's desire to do more than what they should to help another. Understood and accepted. But when we take the example of a firefighter or a police officer putting himself or herself in harm's way as "part of the job", even if emotionally they're attached to the individual they're protecting, the duty comes first. If said individual has a wife, a kid, and a dog to come home to and doesn't want to die that day, the duty overrides the emotional attachment to the value of the self, and renders the blanketed model you advocate a moot point. It's just too generally applied and not strongly supported in all situations without extraneous, self-defining terminology.

[Oblongato]

Actually, there are only a few elements to the argument; it's not all that convoluted as I see it.

The argument in a nutshell:

All conscious actions have their basis in emotion. Emotion can motivate in 3 basic ways:

- incentive: we want to achieve an emotional state
- disincentive: we want to avoid an emotional state
- preservation: we want to prevent an emotional state from passing

A refinement of the definition of conscious action:

A conscious action is an action that requires the participation of the brain. Conscious actions do not include actions out of habit. Emotional detachment is only possible if through the development of habits the brain acts on reflex without a reconsideration of the motive. When the motive is considered, it is always connected to emotion.

********************

I'm not sure what you mean when you say the basis of the argument is becoming more and more skewed and adding more and more terminology and then later say that the argument is too general.

Yes, mechanical repetition can create an emotional response. These emotions may then in turn motivate a departure from the mechanical repetition. Only unconscious mechanical behavior is repeated. (That's what makes it mechanical.)

Anyway, I hope that with this simplification you will be able to pinpoint where you disagree.

[Icarus]

I hope you don't mind, since I agree with your point on emotional basis, that I continue the argument of your flavor of "selfishness".


With this principle at work, however, you should not assume that there is no motivation to help others. The self needs others, and forming good relationships with others, even loving others, serves the self. This is why we do it. You might say it best serves the interests of the self in most cases if the self is concerned with helping others, cooperating with others and making others happy.


This is a matter of individual preference. You're assuming everyone needs certain things they don't necessarily. For example, forming good relationships with others. Positive emotions can be attained through use of various material possessions, which, while requiring others, doesn't require good relationships.

Determining whether "loving" others and helping others is serving the self (By conscious intention) is another matter of preference, which is cause and effect. The best example is the idea of sacrifice. If the benefactor experiences a negative emotion as a result of a conscious action, so that the recipient experiences positive emotions, does the benefactor benefit? He's experiencing an emotion, yes, but not a positive one, and he willingly and knowingly acted towards that.

If the benefactor did indeed benefit, you would have a slight basis for your argument, but you'd still have to prove what the benefactor is thinking, which is impossible. But, in this case, he did not benefit, by your own thesis, which is that all conscious actions are made on the basis of emotions.

And again, if the tastes of an individual permit, one may not need others at all to attain positive emotions. Only then would you be able to say concretely that he/she is a selfish person.

Actually, most of the values in high regard today could easily be attainable without positive relations with others. Most you could simply attain by hoarding money, which in itself is a selfish act, for every dollar you gain, one is taken away from another.

[Oblongato]

You might say it best serves the interests of the self in most cases if the self is concerned with helping others, cooperating with others and making others happy.

Yes, obviously there still exists what we traditionally would refer to as selfishness as well. I didn't pay much attention to that side of the argument for the universal self-interest of the self because it's an easier argument to make. (Compare again the traditional meaning of selfishness compared to what I am referring to here as the universal self-interest of the self).

But it is correct that individuals develop differently, and there are many who do not share values such as cooperation and making others happy etc.

You are also correct, as I have mentioned in this thread or an earlier one, that it isn't really possible to scientifically test theories of self. Again, I am working on a model here that is also based to some extent on my own subjective experience. So far, it hasn't been contradicted by my experience. But I'm not arguing that my model is fact, just that it is plausible, even if we can't test it. Of course, the arguments against it can't really be tested either.

I don't see the problem with the argument for self interest in self sacrifice. When you watch a film, for example, in which someone sacrifices himself for the benefit of others, what emotions do you experience? If this scenario calls up powerful emotions in you, then you probably share at least to some extent the emotional foundation of self-sacrifice. In the most extreme cases, the self values these powerful emotions so much that their importance surpasses the importance of one's own survival.

[Prozerran]

The argument in a nutshell:

All conscious actions have their basis in emotion. Emotion can motivate in 3 basic ways:

- incentive: we want to achieve an emotional state
- disincentive: we want to avoid an emotional state
- preservation: we want to prevent an emotional state from passing

Disincentive and preservation have no real distinguishing features, so I don't see how there are 3 basic ways that emotion can motivate. I would actually argue that there are more than 3 ways that emotion can motivate, but this is working with a different model than yours. Let's keep it simple and stick with your model.

A refinement of the definition of conscious action:

A conscious action is an action that requires the participation of the brain. Conscious actions do not include actions out of habit. Emotional detachment is only possible if through the development of habits the brain acts on reflex without a reconsideration of the motive. When the motive is considered, it is always connected to emotion.

Emotional detachment is, simply put, the will of the individual to act against what would otherwise motivate the individual to act in a way consistent with the motivation illicited by the emotion. Therefore, any conscious action directly opposed to the emotion underlying the act is a result of emotional detachment from the act. The point of issue here is that it's only possible to become emotionally detached out of habit. Again, I think this is overly generalized when specific circumstances exist that would serve to contradict this statement.

**************************************

I'm not sure what you mean when you say the basis of the argument is becoming more and more skewed and adding more and more terminology and then later say that the argument is too general.

Yes, as you continue to add self-defined terminology to make your argument valid, your argument becomes more and more skewed.

Yes, when you state that ALL actions are fundamentally rooted in human emotion, you make an argument that is too general.

And when you take both points and state them in one sentence in an effort to show a contradiction, you create a strawman argument against my position. This is logically fallacious.

Yes, mechanical repetition can create an emotional response. These emotions may then in turn motivate a departure from the mechanical repetition. Only unconscious mechanical behavior is repeated. (That's what makes it mechanical.)

I think you miss the point I'm making here. The emotion you state as a cause for an action actually functions as a response to the action, thereby showing that the emotion is NOT at the root of the act.

Anyway, I hope that with this simplification you will be able to pinpoint where you disagree.

Well, I believe my disagreement with your argument has more to do with the 'mechanics' of your presentation than your actual position. Like I've already stated, I think your argument has merit in the confines of conscious, emotionally-stimulated human behavior. I do not think all human behavior is motivated or stimulated by emotion, and there are several examples I've already proposed where the generalization you make fails to account for the acts that occurred. I don't really know where you're failing to pinpoint the problem. I've practically explained why your argument is wrong as well as what you should do to make it right. Where you go from there is up to you.

**************************************

I don't see the problem with the argument for self interest in self sacrifice. When you watch a film, for example, in which someone sacrifices himself for the benefit of others, what emotions do you experience? If this scenario calls up powerful emotions in you, then you probably share at least to some extent the emotional foundation of self-sacrifice. In the most extreme cases, the self values these powerful emotions so much that their importance surpasses the importance of one's own survival.

The problem with the argument is that you create a correlation by causation argument. This is a fallacy of assumption. You assume that the individual that experiences some powerful emotion shares some emotional foundation of self-sacrifice. Emotion isn't so black and white. It is probably one of the grayest areas of subjective analysis. There are a number of explanations for why someone would experience some powerful emotion that has NO BASIS in self-sacrifice.

If it's a well-crafted movie, the altruistic act serves to shock the audience. In addition, the viewer was probably encouraged to like the character who later sacrifices himself. The most powerful emotion may simply be that of grief, not sacrifice, not nobility, honor, or credence. Just because someone experiences grief at the self-sacrifice of a character that, by design, was intended to illicit grief, doesn't create a sufficient correlation to that of altruism.

[Oblongato]

Disincentive and preservation have no real distinguishing features, so I don't see how there are 3 basic ways that emotion can motivate. I would actually argue that there are more than 3 ways that emotion can motivate, but this is working with a different model than yours. Let's keep it simple and stick with your model.

I think there is an obvious difference between wanting to avoid something and wanting to keep something. And yes, obviously this is not the only possible model.



Emotional detachment is, simply put, the will of the individual to act against what would otherwise motivate the individual to act in a way consistent with the motivation illicited by the emotion. Therefore, any conscious action directly opposed to the emotion underlying the act is a result of emotional detachment from the act. The point of issue here is that it's only possible to become emotionally detached out of habit. Again, I think this is overly generalized when specific circumstances exist that would serve to contradict this statement.

It is entirely possible that the self would choose to act contrary to what would "otherwise motivate". What I disagree with is your assumption that motivation can exist without emotion. I would interpret this situation as either the disincentive motivation described previously or more powerful emotions of any sort overriding the emotion that would otherwise motivate.

The self is emotionally detached in situations that do not emotionally affect the self. But the emotional detachment in these cases is not the motivation. If conscious action is taken, I would argue emotion is present from another source.

*******************************

Yes, as you continue to add self-defined terminology to make your argument valid, your argument becomes more and more skewed.

Yes, when you state that ALL actions are fundamentally rooted in human emotion, you make an argument that is too general.

And when you take both points and state them in one sentence in an effort to show a contradiction, you create a strawman argument against my position. This is logically fallacious.

Maybe you could tell me exactly what self-defined terminology I am using, for starters.

My thesis is that all conscious choices are emotionally motivated. I am making this statement much in the way that one can say that all birds have wings. Of course, my thesis is not provable, as I have acknowledged. I do think that as a model it is consistent with human behavior, however.

And my request for clarification of how your two statements fit together doesn't really qualify as a strawman argument. It was not yet clear enough to me what you meant to argue against it.


I think you miss the point I'm making here. The emotion you state as a cause for an action actually functions as a response to the action, thereby showing that the emotion is NOT at the root of the act.

My point is that mechanical repetition is not conscious thought. If the self is to be motivated to escape the pattern of mechanical repetition, emotion must be present (my basic thesis). As a side point, I acknowledged that emotion may also be generated by an awareness of a state of mechanical repetition.



Well, I believe my disagreement with your argument has more to do with the 'mechanics' of your presentation than your actual position. Like I've already stated, I think your argument has merit in the confines of conscious, emotionally-stimulated human behavior. I do not think all human behavior is motivated or stimulated by emotion, and there are several examples I've already proposed where the generalization you make fails to account for the acts that occurred. I don't really know where you're failing to pinpoint the problem. I've practically explained why your argument is wrong as well as what you should do to make it right. Where you go from there is up to you.

I am only talking about conscious behavior. Much of our behavior is unconscious - we don't consciously decide how to tie our shoes every day, we don't think of a new place to store the spoons every time they are washed - behavior that is not conscious is generally habitual. (I think. Hm. How many types of non-conscious behavior are there?)

********************************

The problem with the argument is that you create a correlation by causation argument. This is a fallacy of assumption. You assume that the individual that experiences some powerful emotion shares some emotional foundation of self-sacrifice. Emotion isn't so black and white. It is probably one of the grayest areas of subjective analysis. There are a number of explanations for why someone would experience some powerful emotion that has NO BASIS in self-sacrifice.

If it's a well-crafted movie, the altruistic act serves to shock the audience. In addition, the viewer was probably encouraged to like the character who later sacrifices himself. The most powerful emotion may simply be that of grief, not sacrifice, not nobility, honor, or credence. Just because someone experiences grief at the self-sacrifice of a character that, by design, was intended to illicit grief, doesn't create a sufficient correlation to that of altruism.

Sorry, I should have been more specific. My point would only apply if the film generates in the viewer an identification with the protagonist and an emotional appreciation for the value of self-sacrifice (the function of which is not necessarily to shock).

[Prozerran]

I think there is an obvious difference between wanting to avoid something and wanting to keep something. And yes, obviously this is not the only possible model.

Wanting to avoid an emotional state and wanting to prevent an emotional state from "passing" can be interpreted as one in the same. It would be clearer if you simply say, "Preservation is the desire to maintain or preserve a particular motion you are sensing in the moment." But whatever. Have you ever tried to preserve an emotion? It just doesn't work like that. "Oh, I'm feeling this great emotion, I want to preserve it." And what do you do to preserve the emotion? You think back to some memory that reminds you of the feeling you sustain. In effect, your thought generates the emotion, not your emotion generating the thought. Yet another example of how emotion doesn't come first in your chain of causality model for human behavior.

It is entirely possible that the self would choose to act contrary to what would "otherwise motivate". What I disagree with is your assumption that motivation can exist without emotion. I would interpret this situation as either the disincentive motivation described previously or more powerful emotions of any sort overriding the emotion that would otherwise motivate.

The self is emotionally detached in situations that do not emotionally affect the self. But the emotional detachment in these cases is not the motivation. If conscious action is taken, I would argue emotion is present from another source.

When you cross the street, most of the time you look both ways. There's no emotional reason to look both ways. It's not even mechanical for me because I have to remember to do it. It's just plain common sense. If I have to have emotion behind every simple, conscious decision I make, then I'm doomed when it comes to the simple common sense activities, mechanical or otherwise. There's no assumption being made here.

*******************************



Maybe you could tell me exactly what self-defined terminology I am using, for starters. 1.)

My thesis is that all conscious choices are emotionally motivated. I am making this statement much in the way that one can say that all birds have wings. Of course, my thesis is not provable, as I have acknowledged. I do think that as a model it is consistent with human behavior, however. 2.)

And my request for clarification of how your two statements fit together doesn't really qualify as a strawman argument. It was not yet clear enough to me what you meant to argue against it. 3.)

1.) Well, your model introduces terminology solely defined to make your argument valid (i.e. your 3 types of emotion for starters, your attempt to redefine 'selfish' to make the argument that all human behavior is selfish, etc.). When you simply make a definition of something out of thin air, at least use a word not already in use. Selfishness has already been defined, as have the various emotional types. I do not know what they are, but I'm pretty sure they aren't defined in terms of 'incentive' or 'disincentive'.

2.) You want me to honestly believe you can draw a comparison between stating that birds have wings and that all human motivation is based on emotion? Wow. Just. Wow. I don't mean to be coy with you, but we can see wings on birds. Tell me how we "see" emotion in human behavior. I mean, literally see it.

3.) This was your statement. "I'm not sure what you mean when you say the basis of the argument is becoming more and more skewed and adding more and more terminology and then later say that the argument is too general." Now, what is the purpose of asking this question? How is this not an attempt to point to a contradiction? Simply put, by asking the question you ask, you group two different points into one interrogatory statement that seems to create a contradiction when it, in fact, doesn't.


My point is that mechanical repetition is not conscious thought. If the self is to be motivated to escape the pattern of mechanical repetition, emotion must be present (my basic thesis). As a side point, I acknowledged that emotion may also be generated by an awareness of a state of mechanical repetition.


The problem with this is that your view of "mechanical" behavior is crossing into the realm of involuntary action. When you take an example like looking both ways when crossing the street, you make a conscious effort to remember to perform this action before crossing the street. Now, over time, you may have less and less difficulty remembering to do it, but the conscious act of looking both ways is still, at its root, fundamentally resolved to generate from a motivation not related to emotion. You do it because you remember to do it, because you should do it, not because you desire to do it.


I am only talking about conscious behavior. Much of our behavior is unconscious - we don't consciously decide how to tie our shoes every day, we don't think of a new place to store the spoons every time they are washed - behavior that is not conscious is generally habitual. (I think. Hm. How many types of non-conscious behavior are there?)

And if we don't consciously decide how to tie our shoes every day, we would never learn to tie our shoes at all. See my previous example of looking both ways when you cross the street. Even if it becomes easier to tie your shoes over time, there is a conscious effort to actually perform the action. An unconscious action would be reflexive. When you touch the hot eye of a stove for the first time, you feel a sharp pain and pull your hand away. This is an involuntary action. Your body reacts unconsciously to prevent harm. And to make the point all the more clearer... later when you may choose to touch the hot eye of a stove to see how long you can do it, you are testing the ability to control your unconscious, reflexive behavior.



********************************



Sorry, I should have been more specific. My point would only apply if the film generates in the viewer an identification with the protagonist and an emotional appreciation for the value of self-sacrifice (the function of which is not necessarily to shock).

Your point doesn't prove anything. You offered this as an example of how self-interest is at the root of altruism. You don't need to specify the conditions that would make this a valid example of your point. What you need to think about is why self-interest might not always be at the root of self-sacrifice. This is getting very redundant. I refuse to spend this much time pointing out the flaws in your reasoning. I'm done. Really.

[Oblongato]

Wanting to avoid an emotional state and wanting to prevent an emotional state from "passing" can be interpreted as one in the same.

And how would one go about that?

When you cross the street, most of the time you look both ways. There's no emotional reason to look both ways. It's not even mechanical for me because I have to remember to do it. It's just plain common sense. If I have to have emotion behind every simple, conscious decision I make, then I'm doomed when it comes to the simple common sense activities, mechanical or otherwise. There's no assumption being made here.


Looking both ways is a habitual action. We learn how to do it as children, and the motivation comes from respect for parental commands and fear of being hit by a car. Do it 1000 times and you stop thinking about it. Not conscious action in my book. If you do actually think about it, you are obviously motivated by fear - i.e. the desire to avoid danger.


1.) Well, your model introduces terminology solely defined to make your argument valid (i.e. your 3 types of emotion for starters, your attempt to redefine 'selfish' to make the argument that all human behavior is selfish, etc.). When you simply make a definition of something out of thin air, at least use a word not already in use. Selfishness has already been defined, as have the various emotional types. I do not know what they are, but I'm pretty sure they aren't defined in terms of 'incentive' or 'disincentive'.

First you complain that I am introducing terminology solely defined to make my case. I'm not claiming that my argument is completely new, but I am not aware of where it might already exist. So how am I supposed to make my point without introducing terms with specifically defined meanings?

Then you complain that I am using pre-existing words in another sense. This is not unheard of in philosophical discussions. The key is to say how you are using the words. Which I have done. Anyway, I have stopped using the word selfish for the most part, replacing it with a description of what I mean, since you refused to accept my modified definition for the purposes of the discussion.

2.) You want me to honestly believe you can draw a comparison between stating that birds have wings and that all human motivation is based on emotion? Wow. Just. Wow. I don't mean to be coy with you, but we can see wings on birds. Tell me how we "see" emotion in human behavior. I mean, literally see it.

Me: Of course, my thesis is not provable, as I have acknowledged. I do think that as a model it is consistent with human behavior, however.
Was this an insufficient qualification of my statement for you?

Now, what is the purpose of asking this question? How is this not an attempt to point to a contradiction? Simply put, by asking the question you ask, you group two different points into one interrogatory statement that seems to create a contradiction when it, in fact, doesn't.


What part of "I'm not sure what you mean when you say" did you not understand as a request for clarification?

The problem with this is that your view of "mechanical" behavior is crossing into the realm of involuntary action. When you take an example like looking both ways when crossing the street, you make a conscious effort to remember to perform this action before crossing the street. Now, over time, you may have less and less difficulty remembering to do it, but the conscious act of looking both ways is still, at its root, fundamentally resolved to generate from a motivation not related to emotion. You do it because you remember to do it, because you should do it, not because you desire to do it.

Indeed, I am crossing into the realm of involuntary behavior, which I would also not define as conscious. Just because you remember you should do something is no reason why this cannot be a habitual action, and therefore, by my definition, not conscious. Also see above.

And if we don't consciously decide how to tie our shoes every day, we would never learn to tie our shoes at all. See my previous example of looking both ways when you cross the street. Even if it becomes easier to tie your shoes over time, there is a conscious effort to actually perform the action. An unconscious action would be reflexive. When you touch the hot eye of a stove for the first time, you feel a sharp pain and pull your hand away. This is an involuntary action. Your body reacts unconsciously to prevent harm. And to make the point all the more clearer... later when you may choose to touch the hot eye of a stove to see how long you can do it, you are testing the ability to control your unconscious, reflexive behavior.


First, we have to be motivated to learn to tie our shoes. Later, we stop thinking about it, and stop thinking about the initial motivation. There are things that we were emotionally motivated to learn as children that we now do automatically. Once something becomes habit, it normally is no longer done consciously. When it is done consciously, there is a new motivation at work. One shouldn't assume that all emotional motivations are powerful, by the way. For slight actions a slight motivation is sufficient. I argue that even slight motivations stem from emotions, which may also be slight.

Your point doesn't prove anything. You offered this as an example of how self-interest is at the root of altruism. You don't need to specify the conditions that would make this a valid example of your point. What you need to think about is why self-interest might not always be at the root of self-sacrifice.

Then produce some examples of dispassionate self sacrifice - i.e. self-sacrifice without emotion. If my thesis is correct (which we can't test, unfortunately), then the emotions involved in self-sacrifice would be the motivating factor and the basis of self interest in the self-sacrificing act. It still fits my model.

I refuse to spend this much time pointing out the flaws in your reasoning. I'm done. Really.

Then quit answering my posts, starting with this one. I don't know what kind of investment you have in not agreeing with me, but in the future if you're having no fun discussing the topic, I suggest you leave the discussion prior to the point where you get snotty.

[Prozerran]

Then quit answering my posts, starting with this one. I don't know what kind of investment you have in not agreeing with me, but in the future if you're having no fun discussing the topic, I suggest you leave the discussion prior to the point where you get snotty.

I have no investment in not agreeing with you, Ob.

This discussion would be fun if we were relying on previously defined terminology to reach new understanding. As it stands, I find myself spinning my wheels with each new term you introduce. Taken as a whole, the basis of your argument rests on the terminology you define to validate your argument. It's essentially saying, "I'm right because I say I'm right, so I think I'm right." Sorry, that's like arguing with a fence post. It's not rational discussion, and it's far from fun for anyone.

There's nothing wrong with defining NEW terminology when nothing exists that symbolizes it. But here we are talking about a field of study with established terminology that has sound explanation and study supporting it. If the terminology that exists doesn't adequately explain your position, that's one thing. You're redefining terminology to make your argument valid, and I just don't have the time to go through it bit by bit.

I don't mean to sound snotty. I really just don't have the time. Sorry.

[Oblongato]

I don't mean to sound snotty. I really just don't have the time. Sorry.

If you don't want to sound snotty, don't be snotty.

This discussion would be fun if we were relying on previously defined terminology to reach new understanding. As it stands, I find myself spinning my wheels with each new term you introduce. Taken as a whole, the basis of your argument rests on the terminology you define to validate your argument. It's essentially saying, "I'm right because I say I'm right, so I think I'm right." Sorry, that's like arguing with a fence post. It's not rational discussion, and it's far from fun for anyone.

Your wheels spin easily. Exactly how many terms caused them to spin? When I put forth a model, I define my terms. If you have a problem with the logic or plausibility of my model (which as we have thoroughly discussed cannot be tested) then say what your problem is. Simply attacking the use of individually defined terminology in general is - how can I say this politely - not helpful. If that's all you've got to say, don't waste your valuable time. I'll spare you an insulting simile (not that I can't come up with some beauties).

[Prozerran]

Your wheels spin easily. Exactly how many terms caused them to spin? When I put forth a model, I define my terms. If you have a problem with the logic or plausibility of my model (which as we have thoroughly discussed cannot be tested) then say what your problem is. Simply attacking the use of individually defined terminology in general is - how can I say this politely - not helpful. If that's all you've got to say, don't waste your valuable time. I'll spare you an insulting simile (not that I can't come up with some beauties).

My wheels spin in circular arguments, and this is just such an argument. Let me show you:

The argument in a nutshell:

All conscious actions have their basis in emotion. Emotion can motivate in 3 basic ways:

- incentive: we want to achieve an emotional state
- disincentive: we want to avoid an emotional state
- preservation: we want to prevent an emotional state from passing

A refinement of the definition of conscious action:

A conscious action is an action that requires the participation of the brain. Conscious actions do not include actions out of habit. Emotional detachment is only possible if through the development of habits the brain acts on reflex without a reconsideration of the motive. When the motive is considered, it is always connected to emotion.

Ok, so you want to show that all conscious actions have their basis in emotion. You bring us three basic ways that emotion motivates conscious behavior, and you introduce terminology to support this. Ok, fine. Emotion is not limited to these three motivational factors, however, but I'll bite. It's your model.

Now you want to redefine conscious action, as though there is a specific qualification to be made of conscious action, and if you qualify it as you do, you can't be wrong because it should be obvious. The problem with this is that you are wrong if you take the entire definition into account. Any action that is not involuntary (i.e. reflexive) is a conscious act. This means that even mundane tasks like tying your shoes or looking both ways when crossing the street are conscious acts that don't involve emotion.

But now you want to introduce more terminology. You want us to believe that there is mechanical conscious behavior and non-mechanical conscious behavior. In effect, you want to create a third group by eliminating any behavior that doesn't fit into your model. I start to wonder why do we need more terminology? Is it because there is a clear distinction to be made among conscious actions? Or is it because there are certain conscious actions that aren't emotionally based? I tend to consider the ladder is the case, which is why I disagree with you. The more terminology you introduce to try and explain away the contradictions, the less agreeable we're going to be. Face it, I never once said your model is complete garbage. In the realm of behavior stimulated by emotion, we are in complete agreement. What you and I disagree on is how you're attempting to prove that all conscious behavior is rooted in emotion.

And I don't believe your model for all conscious behavior can adequately show, based on what conscious behavior is accepted to be, that all conscious behavior is motivated by emotion. You have redefined standard, accepted definitions of behavior and then introduced new self-defined terminology to ultimately validate an argument with false premises. Like I said, you can argue until you're blue in the face that there are more than two forms of behavior, but until everyone agrees that there is something other than conscious and unconscious behavior, your argument for emotion being at the root of ALL behavior is dead in the water. It's not an opinion. This is the observable problem in your argument.

[Oblongato]

Please understand that I am not just bending terminology to make my model work. I really do see a distinction between actions where we take the time to consider (at which point we analyze our motivation) and actions that are basically repetitions of established patterns of action. I am definitely not saying that all actions are motivated by emotion. I am saying that all actions are motivated by emotion that require the mind to analyze the values and the situation. I wanted to call this conscious action (conscious in a particular sense), but I'm willing to substitute another word if you prefer.

I think that it is not necessarily easy to draw a line between an action that we perform without thinking and an action that requires us to refer to our values. I think it's a gradual curve and not an on/off switch. I would like to limit my point to those actions which require our brains to do more than repeat known patterns in known situations. I am referring only to actions where the brain focuses on the situation and references our values. That's why I want to exclude all mechanical actions from my model.

I actually thought my explanation of how mechanical actions might originate in what were once conscious (in my sense of the word) actions was reasonably plausible. I have had many occasions where I have become conscious of an action that I have performed many times mechanically (habitually) and experienced something akin to an awakening. Having experienced a moment of conscious attention to an action normally performed mechanically, I was able see it in a new light and decide once again whether my long forgotten motivation for doing it was still valid. This experience was part of my basis for my model.

[Prozerran]

Please understand that I am not just bending terminology to make my model work. I really do see a distinction between actions where we take the time to consider (at which point we analyze our motivation) and actions that are basically repetitions of established patterns of action. I am definitely not saying that all actions are motivated by emotion. I am saying that all actions are motivated by emotion that require the mind to analyze the values and the situation. I wanted to call this conscious action (conscious in a particular sense), but I'm willing to substitute another word if you prefer.

Hmm. This is interesting. See, I have a different perspective entirely, and I guess I'll just share some of my own experience to address this. In my freshman year of music theory, I had difficulty with some of the things I needed to learn and process in class. The problem was that I was just not emotionally involved in any of the information. There was no magic in any of it. In order to actually make the grades I ended up making, I had to detach myself from the emotional disappointment I was feeling with the material. In effect, the goal was met because I ignored the emotion. I wasn't motivated at all by the emotion. I was motivated by the goal, the objective, the faith in the fact that if I learn the mundane crap, there will be light at the end of the tunnel. And it worked. I didn't avoid the emotional state. I flat out ignored it.

So, I think the point I might make here is that it's difficult for me to digest that there was some emotional motivation at work in this example. And since all I had was faith in some light at the end of the tunnel, there was no real emotional state I was looking to achieve. In the end, it was about keeping emotion OUT of the picture rather than allowing it to dictate how I behaved in the moment.

I think that it is not necessarily easy to draw a line between an action that we perform without thinking and an action that requires us to refer to our values. I think it's a gradual curve and not an on/off switch. I would like to limit my point to those actions which require our brains to do more than repeat known patterns in known situations. I am referring only to actions where the brain focuses on the situation and references our values. That's why I want to exclude all mechanical actions from my model.

O.k., now we're going into a very deep hole. If we go into the reference to values and try to create correlations with emotion, we're going to make this discussion a quagmire. Let's face it, there are more than a few examples where we may act in less mundane tasks based on some reasonable basis, some rational basis, or if you care to bring it to bare, some logical basis. And as we all may or may not know, emotion is not rational. Emotion is very subjective, very in the moment. To come down to it, the emotional element of human behavior is a reactionary element. "It's not what happens, it's how you handle it." You can either let your emotions drive your action when someone threatens to punch you in the face and deck him first, or you can try to handle it rationally by talking your problems out.

I actually thought my explanation of how mechanical actions might originate in what were once conscious (in my sense of the word) actions was reasonably plausible. I have had many occasions where I have become conscious of an action that I have performed many times mechanically (habitually) and experienced something akin to an awakening. Having experienced a moment of conscious attention to an action normally performed mechanically, I was able to see it in a new light and decide once again whether my long forgotten motivation for doing it was still valid. This experience was part of my basis for my model.

Your awareness of some emotional origin in your habitual behavior is certainly notable. Again, let me remind you that it's not so cut and dry. Your "awakening" may have generated emotions after the fact, after your initial introduction to the task at hand. When you first learn to tie your shoes, you may simply be curious, you may think it's a mundane task you shouldn't have to do because your mom has done it for you over and over again, or you may just learn to do it because other kids in school knew how to do it and you were embarrassed because you were the only one who didn't. Out of all of these examples, the latter is the only one that I will agree is specifically motivated by emotion. In the other examples, we're talking about either rationality (in regard to curiosity) or emotional detachment (with regards to learning when you're not motivated to learn). We're in a gray area, we both seem to agree on that, but I think we're still going to have problems here with our ability to narrow all conscious behavior (in reference to the way in which you wish to define it) down to strictly emotional motivation.

[UMSLdragon]

I think, personally, that you guys are trying to define something that is either undefinable or that the definitions are so vast that you can't cover them all without a confilct. You guys are doing a good job though. I'm thoroughly entertained by th topic. But, in my opinion, it seems that what you guys are discussing is almost impossible to cover. Well, impossible to cover it all anyway. I think there are way too many gray areas and ideas that don't fall under something. Sort of like english "jail words." Everytime you define something, something else that's close won't fit. Like how bacteria are plants but aren't plants... catch my drift?

Hmm. This is interesting. See, I have a different perspective entirely, and I guess I'll just share some of my own experience to address this. In my freshman year of music theory, I had difficulty with some of the things I needed to learn and process in class. The problem was that I was just not emotionally involved in any of the information. There was no magic in any of it. In order to actually make the grades I ended up making, I had to detach myself from the emotional disappointment I was feeling with the material. In effect, the goal was met because I ignored the emotion. I wasn't motivated at all by the emotion. I was motivated by the goal, the objective, the faith in the fact that if I learn the mundane crap, there will be light at the end of the tunnel. And it worked. I didn't avoid the emotional state. I flat out ignored it.

I would consider the "lack of" emotion - num or blank - as an emotion. I don't really know how to explain it other than I've experienced it. It's like a hard-core turn off, blankness. I could consider that an emotion even though it could also be "lack-of" emotion. That's my two cents :2cents:

UMSL